In the newly formed Kingdom of Italy the first Intelligence operations were focused on the public order protection and the citizens' security. This analytical, theory-building article examines the pre-existing core of the Italian Intelligence from the pre-unitarian Italian States to the First World War from a different perspective, evaluating the culturally transmitted factors that influence politico-military elites, security communities, and decision-makers.
Introduction
The notions of security and stability are central to our contemporary society. Social and State security is a major pillar if not a prerequisite of a democratic system.
The ability or inability to provide security is central to democratic Nations.
In the near future the Intelligence agencies and governments will increasingly depend on those warning mechanisms which can promptly respond to an even more and complicated task, the prevention of security.
The following article will evolve around the notions of the Italian Intelligence and the application of strategic warning, Intelligence, policy failures, and strategic foresight referred to the Italian Intelligence before the 1861 unification process and to the First World War.
*Pioneer in Intelligence Studies in Italy, during the last 20 years the author's research interests focused on Intelligence, the relation with the Political Science and the Intelligence Cycle. With more
Research Methods
This study uses a three-step methodological approach: data collection, coding and analysis, using qualitative techniques.
In particular using a three stage process includes:
 a discovery phase of data collection;  a coding phase using some of the analytical techniques and proposed methodologies as filters;  an analysis phase using argumentation analysis and Intelligence analysis.
The article offers a number of original contributions to the scientific literature.
First, it re-examines the sources and the theory-building and proposes alternatives to the referable scientific literature accepted and proposed by the majority of scholars.
Secondly, it strengthens the holistic interrelations in terms of consistency between disciplines such as Intelligence studies, history, sociology, political geography, and political science.
The article's mixed methods approach advances a research agenda that addresses potential analytic and cognitive biases that can affect the "at a distance" examination from a pre-unitarian Italian Intelligence up to the First World War.
A new understanding will emerge on how we can contribute to analysing and understanding the previous and future core of the Italian Intelligence system. Thirdly, the proposed mixed methods generate an agenda for possible future studies and researches.
The documents used refer to Open Source documents, archives, publications, and reliable secondary sources.
The article relies on selected primary sources where possible, and a mixed methods, evaluative approach to secondary sources. The crucial gaps in some of the comparative sources are crossed over with newly available sources.
The limitation of this research is due to the fact that it should be treated with an entire volume, and not only with a brief article.
Literature Review
Academic studies, apart from the bibliography proposed in the article, refer mainly to the Italian studies of the sector.
There is not much Literature Review on the topic.
Not to mention Colonna Vilasi (2013) . Storia dei servizi segreti italiani, and This article can thus be a contribution to the gap in the literature of the field, and its relevance is due to the fact that at the moment the evolution of the Italian
Intelligence from the pre-unitarian Italian State to the First World War is not much studied.
From the Pre-Unitarian States to the Unification (1861)
Before describing the organization and the development of the Italian Intelligence in the second half of the nineteenth century, from the foundation of a unified State until the First World War, it is appropriate to illustrate the security management and the information exchange in the pre-unification period.
In the newly formed Kingdom of Italy the first Intelligence operations were focused on the public order protection and the citizens' security (Viviani, 1985) , and were based upon an already existing military and civilian organization that employed a discontinuous number of informers and agents.
They operated secretly or overtly with no respect of the citizens' rights.
In wartime the Intelligence Units were not yet included in the corps and their mission consisted in: land reconnaissance, the enemy's operations spying, and the interrogation of citizens and prisoners.
After the revolutionary coups in the first half of the century, the pre-unitarian
States stepped up the security apparatus, Intelligence and information sharing.
As in other fields, the Kingdom of Sardinia was a forerunner in security matters and public order.
In the early nineteenth century's Grand Duchy of Tuscany, both the "Buon Governo" and the police (whose commander was the president of the "Buon Governo") had the task of protecting the peoples' security.
Under the orders of a hearing officer, the military police tasks were assigned The Guardia di Finanza had the task of gathering and transmitting information to other corps with the result of an overlap of tasks.
In 1849 the Police Guards were abolished, and the police tasks were transferred to the Ministry of War, with the creation of the Directorate of Public Security and Police Public Security.
In the Duchy of Parma, a General Police Directorate was set up for public security. From 1859 on it melted with the Carabinieri corps, and was further accused of the 1831 riots, and put on trial for the incidents.
In 1850 the police tasks, often malfunctioning, passed to the gendarmerie and to the military commands and in 1851 Charles III set up for the first time the preparation of dossiers from governmental employees and professionals.
In the Duchy of Modena the security management was entrusted to a civilian militia as for the countryside security, and to volunteers for public security.
In 1831 a disinformation operation was mastered on behalf of Duke Ferdinand IV against the population and their revolutionary projects.
Fake lodge accommodations were given to let the people believe in the imminent arrival of the Austrian troops (Colonna Vilasi, 2013 ).
In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the police was the most powerful institution; at the top level were the King Secretariat (with a powerful Intelligence service) and the General Police Directorate, depending from provincial directorates, commissioners and inspectors.
Undercover Guards were operating with the task of informing the provincial intendants.
In 1827, due to the limits in tackling the revolutionary movement, it was created the Royal Gendarmerie and the police veterans had the most delicate tasks. The Royal Carabinieri, although a section of the Army, had no military tasks, and their commander was called the "first president of the Buon Governo".
The Buon Governo was replaced in 1816 by the new Ministry of Police with the task of protecting public security and public order.
After the 1821 uprising in Piedmont an information service was implemented.
In 1821-1822 the Royal Patent settled the merging of the Ministry of Police with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with military and civilian commanders.
The guidelines for the police functions, including military police and counterIntelligence (in time of war: camp control, observation of spies and suspects; in time of peace: control on the militaries on leave and license, arrest of resisting persons, detecting deserters from foreign armies) merged into a new regulation, which did not include, however, espionage.
In 1821 a civil service apparatus was constituted, designed by the first Secretary of State, Roget de Cholex, and approved by the King Carlo Felice.
A trusted network of people under coverage (and in conjunction with the reports of the police authorities) had the task of transmitting information to the Secretary of State on the realm, with particular attention to secret societies, to foreign suspects and indicted.
Led by a police Chief Officer, was named "Affari di Polizia" or "Seventh Office". Initially it was ruled by the Marquis Giovanni Raggi and consisted of one hundred employees, divided into three core divisions, plus other peripherals. But also governors and military commanders were included in the top staff so as to create a confusion of responsibilities.
In 1841, the Office was transformed into the "Gabinetto particolare di Polizia".
The military information service developed in the years 1816-1848.
The Kingdom of Sardinia General Staff was created in 1816 with the aim of collecting information for the troops and operations during wartime.
The Savoy Intelligence service can be dated to the period after the First War of In April 1855, the "Breve istruzione sul servizio degli Ufficiali del Corpo Reale di SM in caso di guerra" was drafted, and a special mission section and an Intelligence one were created. The first had tactical tasks, the second strategical.
In 1856 Characterized from a lack of organization and coordination, nevertheless managed successfully in the information collection for the National defense.
The Police was reorganized and divided in a political police or "polizia alta"
and a "polizia bassa", for public security.
In 1861, at the Home Office, the Intelligence Section depended from a political office (Prime Minister's Cabinet), and from a public security office (2 nd Public Security Division).
The latter had information tasks in common crimes, and depended from a Directorate of Public Security and was composed of the Public Security Guards. The Intelligence service was subsequently subject to several changes of name, from "Public Security Affairs" passed to "Police 3 rd Division" (1868) and "Political Bureau at the Directorate of Public Security" (1881). In 1890 the Public Security officers were named officially "city guards".
The so-called "polizia alta" was first named "1st Division General Affairs's Bureau" (1859) and then "Secret Affairs Cabinet" (Ufficio Affari Riservati del Gabinetto-1900).
In 1861, the Home Office Intelligence (political police Section), was misused by the Prime Minister Giovanni Ricasoli to influence elections and control the press.
In 1862, an operation conducted by General Sanfront, former head of Cavour's Intelligence, stopped the Garibaldi's expedition to Austria (Sarnico-Bergamo).
A Military School for the Polish refugees in Cuneo was also created.
Costantino Nigra, ambassador to Paris, before the Third War of Independence (1866), set up an efficient information system about the political and military situation in France.
In 1867, the joint action of the Intelligence, Home Office and Foreign Affairs, focused on Garibaldi's attempts to conquer Rome and tried to provoke an insurrection that would give a hand to Garibaldi's expedition.
In 1874, the Intelligence stopped an insurrection plot in Bologna by the anarchists Andrea Costa and Mikhail Bakunin, and arrested in Florence Anna Kuliscioff, Andrea Costa's lover and assistant.
In 1876 the Home Office information apparatus had a significant expansion and a consequent reorganization during the Left Government.
The new Home Office Minister, Minister Giovanni Nicotera, aware of the importance of an Intelligence apparatus, without informing the Parliament, strengthened its structure.
Several deviation episodes occured: agents infiltrated to gather evidence against Francesco Crispi, illegal funds administration to bribe the press, telegraph and mail tapping.
The Roman Bank affair, one of the six institutions qualified to issue money, and linked to some Left fringes was the first scandal of the "civil service" (in opposition with the military one) and took place in 1892-1894, during Giovanni Giolitti's premiership.
The bank governor, after the arrest, confessed the money paid to Crispi and Giolitti.
The prime minister was forced to resign at the end of 1893, and was replaced by Crispi.
All the accused were conducted to jail, but the judges denounced the disappearance of the documents essential to prove them guilty.
In 1898, the new Prime Minister Luigi Pelloux gave to the Intelligence apparatus full autonomy in the protection of National security and in coping with the frequent riots and anti-militarist propaganda. In the Royal Carabinieri Corps, so named from 1861, merged the pre-unification State's security structure and the information services.
The fourteen legions in which the corps was organized were distributed throughout the territory, especially in the countryside.
In 1863, at the army General Staff was created the "I" Office, a Central Information Office, reflecting the Govone Intelligence structure.
Edoardo Driquet, a colonel of Hungarian origin, was in charge of the service.
After three years, however, was forced to resign, following the defeat of the 1866's military campaigns.
In 1861 the Ministry of the Navy was separated from the War Ministry, and a new information service was created.
The information quest, however, was always up to the local commander and each single unit updated the war situation: via the interrogation of deserters and civilians, observation of enemy activities, border surveillance.
In 1875, the counter-Intelligence activities were attributed to the Carabinieri corps (military police) and had the task of informing the General commands.
The n. 968, 1882 Decree, established the position of Army (SME), Chief of
Staff, that referred to the Minister of War about the troops management.
In 1889 the SMM commander position was established. In 1892 the "Regolamento di servizio di guerra" issued by the Minister of War, specified that the SME Commander, had the task of directing the local information Chief of Staff Unit.
Both the SME commander and the SMM one depended from the General Staff "I" Office.
According to some General Staff documents kept in the SIM archives the "I"
Office was hidden until 1897 and was headed by Colonel Felice de Chaurand de Saint Eustache (Pasqualini, 2006) . After the war in Libya (1911 Libya ( -1912 the Office "I" was strengthened. Thanks to the contribution of many geographers, topographic maps for the troops on the field were realized, and enriched the General Staff monographs and the Military Maps Office.
In 1913 Cesare Battisti, the irredentist from Trentino that participated in the Great War, entered the army Intelligence in charge of patrol until July 1914.
In the years before the First World War, the Italian military Intelligence was not much structured. And the same was with the counter-Intelligence, offices in charge of the interception, and encryption.
From the early years the conflict suffered from the overlapping of tasks with other agencies (the troops reported information to the Supreme Command without passing through the Office "I").
Giovanni Giolitti devoted great attention to the civil service, both as Home
Office Minister (1901 Minister ( -1902 and as Prime Minister (second term: 1903-1905) .
The assassination of King Umberto I by the anarchist Gaetano Brescia (1900) led to a new police Intelligence implementation.
Before the outbreak of the civil war, the Intelligence structure was divided in two sections, each sub-divided in two divisions: the Home Office Cabinet formed by the "Ufficio affari politici e riservati" and the "Servizio informazioni riservate", and the Public Security General Directorate with the "Ufficio riservato"
and the "Servizio di guardie di città" (city guards), a body of the "polizia bassa".
The First World War
At the outbreak of the First World War, the Italian Intelligence was fragmented with no specific tasks assigned. Despite the military Intelligence was under the direction of the "I" Office (Viviani, 1985) , each Corps its own Intelligence Unit, and their reports were given directly to the Supreme Command. The operations Department ("Reparto operazioni e situazioni") had to manage information from two different sources.
The A psychological Unit to the demotivated troops after a severe defeat was soon created. 
Conclusion
As a conclusion, we cannot consider nowadays Italian Intelligence without a ref-
lection on the historical process that led the Italian security agencies throughout the centuries and the pre-unification, unification, and post-unification phases and steps.
